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I. Introduction

uring the past three decades, renewable energy has
shifted from being an afterthought to a preferred source
of power in the United States.1 This shift comes at a
cost. Building renewable energy projects, transitioning from
more traditional energy sources, and keeping America’s energy
infrastructure up to date requires massive amounts of capital
investment in order to be feasible.2 Raising the necessary capital
is one of the biggest obstacles facing renewable energy growth.3
The ability to access the public equity markets to overcome this
obstacle and fund these projects will be paramount to the continued growth of the renewable energy sector.4
Oil and gas energy producers have used the master limited
partnership (“MLP”) as a means to efficiently raise capital in
the public equity markets.5 MLPs are traded on public stock
exchanges. Rather than shares, an investor purchases units that
are limited partnership interests.6 The sponsor is the general
partner, who typically retains two percent ownership in the
MLP.7 Because the MLP is structured as a flow through entity,8
this affords two main benefits: (1) that the MLP does not pay any
tax at the entity level;9 and (2) that the entity has the ability to
make special allocations of income and expenses, which allows
the general partner to create innovative incentive structures.10
In order to qualify as an MLP, 90 percent or more of the gross
income of the partnership must be “qualifying income.”11 Per
section 7704(d)(1)(E) of the Internal Revenue Code, qualifying
income consists of “income and gains derived from the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining,
transportation (including pipelines transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral or natural resource
(including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber) . . . .”12 While
the Internal Revenue Code specifically allows ventures involved
in the exploration, development, mining and productions of oil
and gas to pay zero entity level tax, the production of wind, solar
or hydroelectric power is not considered qualifying income and
thus cannot utilize the MLP structure.13
As a result, producers of renewable energies have had to
raise public equity through other means and have tried to provide
energy investors the tax-free yield they desire in different ways.14
One such way in which renewable energy investors provide energy
investors with tax free yield is through the use of an investment
vehicle known as the yieldco.15 Yieldcos are created by a parent
company, again known as the sponsor, who is engaged in the
building of renewable energy assets.16 The sponsor, having built
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wind or solar assets is eligible to claim a number of tax credits and
accelerated depreciation deductions. Once the assets are built, and
in some cases, long-term contracts secured to purchase the electricity, the sponsor will sell or contribute the assets to a yieldco.
As a result, the hallmark characteristics of a yieldco are an asset
or assets producing long-term steady cash flow, and large amounts
of tax credits or tax deductions which would have been generated
through the building of the facility.17 The resulting yieldco is a
corporation which, despite having positive cash flow and making
distributions to its investors, will not have taxable income for a
number of years because the deductions and credits will create a
“tax shield” that is carried forward until used completely.18 The
lack of taxable income allows the corporation to make distributions tax-free (i.e. the person receiving the distribution does not
pay tax on the dividends).19 This is because when a corporation
with no taxable income makes distributions, instead of being
considered a dividend, the distributions are instead considered a
tax-free return of capital.20
Despite its name, the yieldco is legally no different from any
other corporation trading on a public equity market.21 The corporation simply happens to possess yield producing renewable
energy assets and the associated tax credits and deductions.22
However, it is important to note that the entity will become taxable at prevailing rates, and investors will pay tax on any dividends received when these tax credits and deductions are used in
their entirety.23 At that point, the corporation would pay taxes in
the same manner as any other corporation, unless new assets are
purchased which carry further deductions and credits.24
As an alternative, the yieldco could liquidate or restructure,
in effect having a limited life. In this case, the market must take
this future potential tax or limited life into account when calculating the enterprise value of a yieldco.25 Therefore, from a purely
tax standpoint, the yieldco is less efficient than an MLP, and the
sophisticated investor would generally prefer an MLP when faced
with the same circumstances.26 This has the effect, at least in
theory, of making the cost of capital higher for the yieldco.27
Congress, in recognizing the unavailability of the MLP
structure to the renewable energy sector as a disadvantage,
is making an attempt to rectify the situation by introducing
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a bill entitled The Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act
(“MLPPA”).28 In short, the bill would expand qualifying income
to include renewable sources of energy, which opens up the MLP
structure to renewable energy producers and allow them to raise
capital through the same structure that oil and gas producers
have utilized for years.29 While most of the press regarding the
bill has been positive, and there has been no outspoken opposition, there remain significant challenges to its passage. There is
the possibility that the bill will be held hostage by further tax
reform.30 Specifically, some may support the bill only if the other
tax credits available to renewable energy are repealed, in effect
viewing MLP treatment for renewable energy providers as a subsidy on top of a subsidy.31
Many would agree that promoting renewable energy is a
worthwhile endeavor because it would promote a cleaner environment and reduce dependence on imported oil.32 Allowing
renewable energy access to the same public equity capital as the
oil and gas industries would be an important step in promoting
renewable energy growth. However, eliminating the ability of
the oil and gas industry to utilize the MLP rather than opening
it up to the renewable energy sector best achieves this objective.
By exploring the broad history and current landscape of the
relevant tax code, this paper aims to show that the current use of
the MLP within the energy sector is inconsistent with and contravenes the original intent of Congress. As a result, those wishing to promote renewable energy as a preferred source of energy
and achieve capital raising equality with fossil fuel sources are
fighting the wrong fight in seeking parity within the MLP landscape. Instead of broadening the scope of the MLP to include
renewable energy, the structure should be limited in such a way
as to preclude oil and gas companies from operating as MLPs.33
Part II A of this paper explores the history, mechanics and
legislative background of the MLP. Part II B of this paper explains
the Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”) and the Production Tax Credit
(“PTC”), both of which are integral to understanding the current
tax landscape of renewable energy. This part also explores the
yieldco, the primary investment vehicle that renewable energy
uses as an alternative to the MLP. Part III explains why the MLP
Parity Act is a misguided attempt at achieving capital raising
parity, and asserts that the better option is to discontinue the oil
and gas industry’s ability to utilize the MLP. Part IV explains the
likely objections to such a proposal and Part V concludes.

II A. The History and Mechanics of the
Master Limited Partnership
In the 1970’s, the highest individual tax bracket was seventy
percent, and tax shelters utilizing the partnership form were a
popular way to shelter income. Just as partners were taxed on
their share of taxable income, partners were also able to utilize
their share of partnership losses. Today, various regulations limit
the amount of losses that an investor can utilize,34 but at that time
any and all losses from the partnership could be used to shield
personal income tax. For these reasons, the Apache Petroleum
Company formed thirty-three oil and gas partnerships between
1959 and 1978. The main appeal of these partnerships were their
Fall 2016

tax sheltering properties.35 The partnerships were engaged in the
exploration of oil, and their main allure was the fact that sixtyfive percent of the investment could be written off in the first
year and ninety percent within three years.36 If the entity found
oil, the investor also had the possibility of making a large return
on the money invested.37 Despite these benefits, investors in the
partnership had no readily available means to sell the partnership
interest.38 As a result, some investors, who had initially invested
for the tax benefits, now faced the dilemma of owning an illiquid
partnership interest that started producing taxable income after
its tax benefits were exhausted. This confluence of events led to
the formation of the first MLP:
[i]n February 1981, Ray Plank, president and chief
executive officer of the Apache Petroleum Co., had a
decision to make. The limited partnership tax shelter[s]
formed eight-to-ten years earlier [were] now generating taxable income, and many discussions and debates
ensued as to what should be done with these shelters. . .
What followed was a roll-up of the shelters into a single
MLP.39 A roll-up provides existing limited partners in
private or nontraded partnerships with the opportunity
to exchange their interests for interest in an MLP. Thus,
the roll-up of the Apache shelters into a single MLP provided two results. First, it allowed for the collection of
thirty-three separate limited partnerships into one, and
second, it provided the investors with a liquid security
for their interest [which] could be publicly traded. The
success of the MLP was charted in the marketplace.40
At the same time this occurred, the highest tax bracket for
individuals decreased from seventy percent to fifty percent. With
the corporate rate at forty-six percent, the individual rate became,
for the first time, comparable to the corporate rate. When taking
into account other factors, such as the double taxation problem
of corporations, for the first time in history being taxed as an
individual was preferable to being taxed as a corporation.41
As early as 1983, Forbes magazine predicted the disincorporation of America in order to avoid the corporate tax.42 The
MLP quickly caught on, and by 1987 there were over 100 MLP
IPOs.43 While industries that were familiar to the partnership
form, such as oil, gas and real estate, were most common (i.e.
those which were common tax shelters in the 1970’s), any type
of business could use the structure, and at one time the Boston
Celtics, La Quinta Motor Inn, casinos and financial advisors
were all structured as MLPs.44
The Treasury Department, concerned that the decline of
corporate tax was becoming a trend, began to petition Congress
as early as 1984.45 They claimed that a publicly traded partnership was merely a corporation in disguise and therefore should
pay corporate tax.46 They also claimed that the complexities of
partnership taxation were too much of an administrative burden
for the average taxpayer.47 In 1984 they unsuccessfully proposed
to tax any partnership with more than thirty-five partners as
a corporation.48 It was not until the summer of 1987 that successful action was taken. At that time, The Omnibus Budget
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Reconciliation Act of 1987 (“OBRA”) was enacted.49 It added
three new sections to the Internal Revenue Code, with section
7704 being the most relevant.
Section 7704 applies to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1987.50 Subsection (a) states the general rule
that “a publicly traded partnership shall be treated as a corporation.”51 Subsection (b) defines “publicly traded partnership”
and subsection (c) is entitled “[e]xception for partnerships with
passive type income.”52 It explains that when 90 percent of a
partnership’s gross income is considered qualifying income, the
exception will be met. Section 7704(d)(1) lists the types of qualifying income. They include interest, dividends, real property
rents, gains from disposition of real property and most relevant
for present purposes:
income and gains derived from the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining,
transportation (including pipelines transporting gas,
oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral or natural resource (including fertilizer, geothermal
energy, and timber), industrial source carbon dioxide,
or the transportation or storage of any fuel. . . 53
As a result, if ninety percent of the entity’s gross income
can be considered qualifying income, an MLP can get the best of
both worlds: the liquidity associated with being publicly traded
on an exchange and no corporate level income tax.
Utilizing this structure, companies engaged in the production, transportation, and storage of fossil fuels and its related
infrastructure (known as the sponsor and serving as the MLP’s
general partner) have been able to successfully raise large
amounts of capital from public sources.54 Like investors in utility companies and energy stocks, typically the MLP has attracted
investors seeking long-term stable yield, and in fact, most MLPs
distribute large amounts of their available cash to their investors.
In most cases, the partnership agreement will require the MLP to
distribute all “available cash.”55
One of the main reasons that most MLPs have high yields is
due to the nature of the incentive structure.56 In most MLP structures, the general partner is incentivized to increase cash distributions to investors as much as possible because they own incentive
distribution rights (“IDR”).57 The IDRs are similar to a carried
interest, which will be familiar to those who follow the hedge
fund and private equity industries; instead of being based upon net
income, however, IDRs are based upon cash distributed.58
In essence, IDRs are partnership interests that are subordinate to the limited partners’ (public) investment. This means that
they share a large portion of the downside risk, but they have the
benefit of also sharing in a much larger portion of the upside.59
Mechanically, when cash distributions are made, the public is
first paid its distributions up to an amount stated in the offering
document.60 The sponsor shares pro-rata (the general partner
will typically own two percent of the MLP and thus take two
percent of the cash).61 Distributions exceeding the stated amount
is then subject to a sliding scale, increasing from two percent to
fifteen percent, twenty five percent and as high as fifty percent.
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This means, that despite injecting two percent of the capital,
the general partner can take up to fifty percent of the cash distributed.62 This provides a powerful incentive for the sponsor to
maximize distributions.63
It may seem that investors’ and sponsors’ interests are aligned
in seeking to maximize distributions.64 However, this incentive
can perversely affect management’s decision-making process.65
Examples include diluting investors by offering new MLP units
to raise capital to increase distributions, obtaining new debt to
finance distributions, and delaying or ignoring capital improvements to instead use cash for distribution purposes.66 In each of
these situations, investors’ and sponsors’ interests diverge.67 Since
there is no clawback68 function associated with the incentive distribution rights, this incentive structure favors short term gains at
the potential risk of long term financial health.69
While a sponsor would argue that the IDR structure compensates it for the risk it takes in owning subordinate units
and for managing the MLP, the mechanics are quite different.
Similar to carried interest, the compensation is not a deduction
to the MLP and income to the sponsor, but instead a reallocation
of income away from the public’s units to the sponsor.70 It should
also be noted that a reallocation as described above is something
that is available only in the partnership form71 and therefore is a
benefit unique to the partnership.72 This has the effect of making
the economics of an investment in an MLP potentially very different from that of a traditional publicly traded corporation.
At this point, it may not be self-evident as to why any
exception exists for a publicly traded entity to be exempt from
tax. Two main questions arise. First, why create any exception
at all for publicly traded partnerships and instead simply make
all publicly traded partnerships taxable? Second, if we accept
that some should be exempt from tax, why are the oil and gas
industries exempt?
As stated above, Section 7704(c) is entitled “[e]xception for
partnerships with passive-type income,” so when considering the
taxability of a publicly traded partnership, we can more narrowly
ask, why create an exception for passive-type income? Here, the
legislative history is instructive.
In general, the purpose of distinguishing between
passive-type income and other income is to distinguish
those partnerships that are engaged in activities commonly considered as essentially no more than investments, and those activities more typically conducted in
corporate form that are in the nature of active business
activities. In the former case, the rationale for imposing an additional corporate-level tax on investments
in publicly traded partnership form is less compelling,
because purchasers of such partnership interests could
in most cases independently acquire such investments
(or the income has already been subject to corporatelevel tax, in the case of dividends). Where the activity
of the partnership does not fall into the category of generating passive-type income, however, it is less likely
that direct interests in the activity would be available
to investors; rather, it is more likely that such activities
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

would be conducted in corporate form and would therefore be subject to corporate level tax before profits
reached the hands of investors.73
In terms of interest, dividends, real property rents and
gains from the disposition of real property, to the extent that the
income truly is passive, “imposing an extra layer of corporate
tax makes little sense.”74 Legislative history also instructs as to
when passive activity may become active.
In determining whether income is treated as passive-type
income under the provision, in the case of interest and
real property rents, it is not intended that amounts contingent on profits be treated as interest or rent. Similarly,
amounts based on gross income earned in connection
with a non-real estate related activity such as a fast food
operation are not treated as passive-type income. Interest
or rent (or other amounts) contingent on profits involves
a greater degree of risk, and also a greater potential for
economic gain, than fixed (or even a market-indexed)
rate of interest or rent, and thus is more properly regarded
as from an underlying active business activity.75
While the above makes clear when rents or interest may
cease to be passive, there is no analogous provision concerning
natural resources. While investments in natural resources may be
similar to collecting rent or interest, as in the case where an MLP
“merely passes along royalties from a productive well or steady
income from a pipeline,”76 the legislative history offers no help
in determining when or how the line might be crossed. Instead,
a reading of the legislative history might leave one wondering
whether any such line exists:
In the case of natural resources activities, special considerations apply. Thus, passive-type income from such
activities is considerably broader, and includes income
and gains from exploration, development, mining or
production, refining, transportation (including through
pipelines transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or
marketing of, any mineral or natural resource, including geothermal energy and timber. (emphasis added)
Many attribute these “special considerations” to powerful
Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen, who had strong ties to the oil
and gas industry.77 In his New York Times article Victor Fleisher
states bluntly “that is code for ‘effective lobbying.” He goes on
to explain that today’s MLPs are not simply passive type investments, instead many are
growth companies with volatile earnings. They hold
out the promise of capital appreciation, not just steady
income, to attract investors. As more MLP’s come to
resemble normal operating companies, the tax loophole
looks more like a straightforward tax subsidy for fossil fuel production. From an environmental standpoint,
this is exactly backward. We should be taxing carbon
production, not subsidizing it.78
It is clear that today’s MLPs are not analogous to an investment that a group of people may purchase individually, nor are
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they passive investment vehicles. Instead they are very sophisticated operating companies. To include them under the heading
of passive investments is to distort the original intent Congress
had when Section 7704 was added to the Internal Revenue Code.

II B. The Investment Tax Credit,
the Production Tax Credit and the Yieldco
The yieldCo has evolved as an effective means for producers
of renewable energy to raise public capital in a world where the
MLP structure is unavailable due to the current definition of qualifying income.79 Essentially looking to create a synthetic MLP, the
producers of the wind or solar energy producing assets (again, the
sponsor) contribute these assets along with the tax credits they
generated into a newly formed corporation.80 The tax credits are a
key part of the equation in that they allow the yieldCo to shield tax
and thus make tax-free distributions.81 In most circumstances, the
sponsor has already completed building these assets and, in many
cases, has already entered into long term contracts for the electricity these assets will produce.82 The result is a corporation owning
completed projects with the ability to produce long-term stable
yield that will be tax-free for a period of time.83 The sponsor will
usually retain a voting majority in the corporation thus retaining
control84 and, in many cases, the yieldCo will have a right of first
offer for the sponsor’s future projects.85
In order to compare the MLP and the YieldCo, it must first
be understood that the YieldCo structure is not nearly as attractive without the tax credits that its assets generate.86 These tax
credits, known as the Federal Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”)87
and the Federal Production Tax Credit (“PTC”)88 are designed to
promote investment in renewable energy projects and production
of renewable energy89 and offer a dollar for dollar reduction in
the income taxes they would otherwise have to pay the federal
government.90 The ITC currently offers a tax credit of thirty
percent of the amount invested in renewable energy projects,91
however, this is scheduled to be reduced to ten percent at the
end of 2023 with a phase out beginning in 2020.92 The PTC is
offered per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated from renewable energy sources.93 The PTC will begin phasing out in 2017
and will be completely phased out within five years. A taxpayer
gets the benefit of one credit or the other, but cannot take both.94
The tax benefits95 generated will far outweigh the amount of
taxable income generated in the first year of operation96 and are
carried forward until used completely by offsetting future taxable
income. Typically, this period will last five to ten years.97 During
this time, distributions made by the corporation will be considered
return of capital rather than dividend income and will be tax-free.98
With this background, we can see that almost all energy produced in the United States is subsidized in one way or another.99
Renewable energy producers, while not eligible to be treated as
an MLP, nevertheless take advantage of significant tax credits.100
As compared with the MLP whose investors enjoy distributions
that are typically eighty percent tax-free and can last indefinitely,
the YieldCo offers distributions that are 100% tax-free and can
last five to ten years.101
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It is important to understand that if an MLP were to
somehow fail the qualifying income test and be taxed as a corporation, that entity, although legally a partnership, would pay
corporate tax.102 Economically, at least from a tax perspective,
it would therefore be no different from the yieldco.103 Of course,
this entity would not have the renewable energy tax credits available to it. Assuming all else was equal and the entity still had its
other tax deductions available, corporate tax would be payable
on net income like any other corporation.104 Distributions would
be split between return of capital and dividend income with personal income tax being paid on the dividend portion.105

III. The MLP Parity Act and Why It Is
A Misguided Attempt at Parity
The Master Limited Partnership Parity Act (“MLPPA”)
was initially introduced in September of 2012106 and again later
in April of 2013.107 After both attempts died in Congress, the
MLPPA has again been reintroduced in June of 2015.108 Senator
Christopher Coons explains the MLPPA:
The MLP Parity Act simply expands the definition of
“qualified” sources to include clean energy resources
and infrastructure projects. Specifically included are
those energy technologies that qualify under Sections
45 and 48 of the tax code, including wind, closed and
open loop biomass, geothermal, solar, municipal solid
waste, hydropower, marine and hydrokinetic, fuel cells,
and combined heat and power.
The legislation also allows for a range of transportation
fuels to qualify, including cellulosic, ethanol, biodiesel,
and algae-based fuels, as well as energy-efficient
upgrades for buildings, electricity storage, carbon capture and storage, renewable chemicals, and waste-heatto-power technologies.
The MLP Parity Act does not affect any current MLP
entity. All projects currently eligible to structure as
MLPs would continue to qualify exactly as they would
under existing law.109
The website goes on to list a number of supporters, including sponsors from the Senate and the House, both Democrat
and Republican, as well as numerous businesses, trade associations, environmental advocates and think tanks.110 Other
news articles tout the MLPPA as a “no brainer” for renewable
energy.111 While its sponsors laud the bill for having bipartisan
support and other news articles proclaim that it is “ready for
passage,”112 its passage is far from guaranteed. If the MLPPA is
buried in other tax reform it will be a long shot for it to make it
through Congress.113
Senator Coons explains the MLPPA as “[a] bill to level the
playing field by giving investors in renewable energy projects
access to a decades-old corporate structure with a tax advantage currently available only to investors in fossil fuel-based
energy projects.”114 While leveling the playing field is certainly
an admirable goal when it comes to renewable energy, Senator
34

Coons and supporters fail to consider the negative aspects of the
MLP.115 There are three main reasons why the MLPPA should
not be passed.
First, in 1987, Congress decided to close the MLP loophole
by taxing all publicly traded partnerships as corporations except
for those engaged in passive type activities.116 Through effective
lobbying, the oil and gas industry was able to maintain that loophole in the tax code by asserting that they should be considered
a passive activity and continue to utilize the MLP structure.117
Allowing certain types of publicly traded partnerships to operate without incurring taxation was based upon the idea that they
held such investments that were akin to investments one could
purchase in their individual capacity.118 The current MLPs do
not resemble pooled passive investments; rather they are large
operating companies.119 Allowing them to operate as MLPs is
clearly in direct contravention of Congress’ original intent.120
Renewable energy providers are no different. Large scale solar
projects and wind farms are not passive activities which investors can purchase individually or as a pooled investment. They
require skilled management teams and operational expertise121
and therefore should not be considered passive investments eligible for MLP treatment.
Second, allowing MLPs to operate without incurring entity
level tax costs the Treasury millions in tax revenue each year. In
February of 2015, President Obama’s 2016 budget proposed to
eliminate the availability of the MLP to the oil and gas industry
by 2021.122 The proposal projected that taxing MLPs as corporations would rise upwards of $300 million a year in tax revenue
starting in 2021.123 This again appeared in the 2017 budget.124
While the 2016 budget proposal attracted some media attention,
the 2017 proposal along with the entire 2017 budget garnered
minimal media coverage and has largely been viewed as irrelevant.125 Nevertheless, the budget proposals serve to quantify
the amount of subsidies the oil and gas industry receive each
year by approximating the amount of taxes saved by utilizing the
MLP structure.
Lastly, the MLP’s incentive structure is designed to benefit
the sponsor at the detriment of investors. Instead of being managed by a board of directors, MLPs are frequently managed by
a general partner (or a manager when structured as an LLC)
and, as a result, investors in MLPs may have less protection
than investors in corporations.126 Furthermore, ownership of the
IDRs incentivizes management behavior, which diverges from
investors’ best interests127 and substantial evidence exists that
many retail investors do not understand exactly what they are
buying when they purchase MLP units on the stock exchange.
Rather than expanding the MLP to include renewable
energy sources, those that truly wish to level the playing field
should be focused on closing this loophole available to oil and
gas.128 In order to put the renewable energy industry on par with
fossil fuels, the appropriate step should be eliminating Section
7704(d)(1)(E) from the Internal Revenue Code. This would have
the effect of eliminating the tax subsidies available to fossil fuels
by taxing them as any other operating company129 and in the
process raising tax revenues.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

IV. Objections
There are obvious hurdles in overhauling a major section
of the tax code.130 MLPs have been around for almost thirty
years, and there are currently over 130 of them trading on public
stock exchanges.131 If entity level taxes were imposed on MLPs,
this would likely be phased in slowly over a number of years.132
Nevertheless, the imposition of future taxes would affect future
earnings projections and current valuations.133 Likewise, it
would undoubtedly have an effect on the ability of oil and gas
sponsors to raise public equity for future projects.134 The resulting market turmoil would be enough for opponents to strongly
resist change of the status quo. Opponents would argue that this
turmoil and the higher cost of capital for raising public equity
would slow the growth of American’s energy infrastructure and
cause consumer energy prices to rise.135
Americans have become accustomed to cheap energy over
the last few decades.136 Despite enjoying some of the cheapest
energy prices in the world, Americans continue to seek cheaper
energy.137 Politicians continually promise policies to lower energy
prices and consumers purchase some of the least fuel-efficient
automobiles in the world.138 As a result, any policy raising energy
prices is likely to be extremely unpopular and will face strong
headwinds.139 Navigating and overcoming these political challenges, although problematic and particularly troublesome, will be
a necessary step in reforming the tax code to achieve parity.
In addition, certain elected leaders have a continuous history of ignoring climate change140 and as a result have been
unsympathetic towards tax reform to promote renewable energy
at the expense of the oil and gas industry.141 As stated above,
some members of Congress have been unwilling to support MLP
Parity while the ITC and PTC are still in existence.142 Those
members would probably argue that because of the availability
of the tax credits, the renewable energy sector already has capital
raising parity with the oil and gas industry.
It is arguable that the ITC and PTC are more valuable
than the MLP structure, and in fact there seems to be a general
consensus that trading tax credits for the MLP structure would
be a net negative for the renewable energy sector.143 While the
ITC and PTC are scheduled to phase out and end, this has been
the case before and in each case they have been renewed and in
some cases expanded.144 As a result, any legislation repealing
the availability of the MLP to oil and gas while the ITC and
PTC are still in effect is likely to be extremely hard to pass.

Unfortunately, this probably means that any chance of repealing
the MLP structure may also require repeal of the ITC and PTC.

V. Conclusion
Although repealing section 7704(d)(1)(E) may be challenging, it is the best option for achieving capital raising parity between fossil fuels and renewable energy. Furthermore, it
is important that those arguing for parity for renewable energy
understand that enacting the MLP Parity Act can and will have
consequences beyond simply allowing producers of renewable
energy more tax efficient public capital. The MLP Parity Act
will expand and continue the use of the MLP, which, in turn,
will have the effect of fueling America’s continued energy irresponsibility with subsidized energy. It will expand the use of an
investment structure that Congress had good reason to shut the
door on in 1987 but survived only due to oil and gas lobbyists. It
will promote an investment, which although available to the general public, has recently come under fire as a vehicle enabling
managers to take short term risks that may be detrimental to the
long-term health of the company.
While oil and gas has its own set of tax subsidies unique
to their industry, the renewable energy industry has valuable
tax subsidies in the form of the ITC and the PTC. Advocates
seeking capital raising parity for renewable energy would be
well advised to note the opposition to allowing the renewable
energy sector access to the MLP markets while the ITC and PTC
are still in effect. Enacting the MLP Parity Act and expanding
section 7704 to include renewable energy would allow renewable energy the use of the MLP structure to raise public capital
alongside oil and gas. However, if enacted it would most likely
make it much harder, if not impossible, to renew the ITC and
PTC in the future.
While those who support a policy towards increasing
America’s use of renewable energy would certainly prefer to
keep the ITC and PTC while gaining access to the MLP structure, the current state of American politics make this an unlikely
proposition. As a result, proponents of the MLP Parity Act may
be forced to trade the ITC and PTC for access to the MLP structure or wait until the tax credits expire. If supporters of capital
raising parity for renewable energy also seek to retain the ITC
and PTC, an attempt to repeal section 7704(d)(1)(E) has a better
chance at achieving that goal than the MLP Parity Act and in the
process, achieves significantly more.
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